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Abstract—Developers frequently rely on free static analysis 
tools to automatically detect vulnerabilities in the source code of 
their applications, but it is well-known that the performance of 
such tools is limited and varies from one software development 
scenario to another, both in terms of coverage and false positives. 
Diversity is an obvious direction to take to improve coverage, as 
different tools usually report distinct vulnerabilities, but this may 
come with an increase in the number of false alarms. In this paper, 
we study the problem of combining diverse static analysis tools to 
detect web vulnerabilities, considering four software development 
scenarios with different goals and constraints, ranging from low 
budget to high-end (e.g., business critical) applications. We con-
ducted an experimental campaign with five free static analysis 
tools to detect vulnerabilities in a workload composed by 134 
WordPress plugins. Results clearly show that the best solution de-
pends on the development scenario. Furthermore, in some cases, a 
single tool performs better than the best combination of tools. 
Keywords—static analysis; vulnerability detection; XSS; SQLi. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pervasive use of web applications poses new security 
challenges to developers. These applications are commonly built 
in a short time and with tight budgets, often leading to the pres-
ence of bugs and security weaknesses. When deployed, such ap-
plications are instantly exposed to millions of Internet users, and 
may be exploited by hackers, putting at risk the valuable assets 
within. In fact, the number of attacks documented by different 
entities has been growing in the past years. The consequences of 
such attacks can be huge, including financial cost, liability is-
sues, brand damage, and loss of market share [1]. 
Content Management Systems (CMS) are increasingly used 
to support the development of web applications, as they provide 
many built-in features, allowing rapid development [4]. Moreo-
ver, they allow new features to be easily added through modules, 
themes and plugins. WordPress is the most popular and widely 
used open-source CMS adopted by businesses of all sizes and 
everyday website owners [2]. It supports the development of 
websites based on PHP resources, with over 44,000 plugins that 
have been downloaded more than 1.25 billion times. However, 
some of these plugins have vulnerabilities and, since a single 
plugin may be used in thousands of websites, they are an attrac-
tive target for hackers. For instance, 22% of the 170,000 web-
sites hacked in 2012 were attacked via vulnerable plugins [3]. 
Unfortunately, the situation has not been improving, as shown 
in a study conducted by Sucuri [4] in the first quarter of 2016, 
which reports that 25% of all compromised WordPress sites 
(89,000) were attacked by exploiting three vulnerable plugins 
used in all of them (TimThumb, RevSlider, and GravityForms). 
Static analysis tools (SATs) inspect the source code of soft-
ware, without executing it, to discover potential bugs that lead 
to security vulnerabilities [6]. Therefore, they provide a valuable 
support during the software development lifecycle by automat-
ing the task of searching for the location of candidate vulnera-
bilities [7] [8]. However, SATs have recurring limitations, such 
as missing some of the vulnerabilities (false negatives (FN)) and 
generating many false alarms (false positives (FP)). These limi-
tations arise from conceptual constraints of the static analysis 
process that mainly checks the structure of a program based on 
fixed rules and does not consider the user input data or the dy-
namic characteristics of the application [9]. Therefore, it is 
known that different SATs report distinct sets of security vulner-
abilities, with some overlap [8][10][11].  
The state-of-the-art SATs are, on average, able to detect 
about half of the existing security vulnerabilities [16]. To im-
prove their overall detection capabilities, some researchers have 
proposed combining the results of multiple SATs to improve de-
tection [17] [18] [19]. Of particular interest is the work of Diaz 
et al. [12], which compares the performance of nine SATs, most 
of them commercial tools, against the NIST SAMATE (Soft-
ware Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation) Reference Da-
taset test suite [13]. Based on the results, the authors recom-
mended the use of several tools with different designs and de-
tection algorithms and/or heuristics to improve the analysis re-
sults. On the other hand, Beller et al. [14] investigated how com-
mon is the use of SATs in real-world, taking as reference the 122 
most popular Open-Source Software projects. The results show 
that a single SAT was used in 41% of the projects, two SATs in 
22% of the projects, and three SATs in 14% of the projects. This 
suggests that developers might not be aware of the benefits of 
using multiple tools and/or that the increase of false positives 
reported may lead developers to avoid using multiple SATs [15]. 
However, existing works are limited in several aspects: the 
workloads are synthetic or just small sets of applications, the 
evaluation metrics used are too simple (e.g., number of true pos-
itives (TP)), and the analysis does not consider the specificities 
of the development scenarios were the tools can be used, which 
may vary both in terms of development time and resources. 
In this paper, we argue that the use of multiple SATs might 
be helpful, as more vulnerabilities may be reported, however, 
the drawback is that the number of false positives may at the 
same time increase. Furthermore, we also claim that the accepta-
ble/expected outcome of the static analysis process (in terms of 
coverage and FPs) depends on the scenario. A scenario is a real-
istic situation of vulnerability detection that depends on the crit-
icality of the application being developed and on the security 
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budget available. Antunes et al. [20] proposed four scenarios 
with increasing requirements: min-effort, best-effort, height-
ened-critical, and business-critical. For example, while the min-
effort scenario has a very tight budget, so a high number of FPs 
is unacceptable due the cost associated with the excessive man-
ual verification needed, in a business-critical scenario the objec-
tive is to detect the most vulnerabilities possible, even if that re-
quires spending budget analyzing FPs. Thus, it is no longer ev-
ident that combining more SATs is better in every case.   
This work studies the potential of combining the outputs of 
multiple SATs as a way to improve the performance of vulnera-
bility detection across different realistic development scenarios. 
In practice, we formulate the following four hypotheses: 
H1: The number of vulnerabilities detected always in-
creases as the number of combined SATs increases. 
H2: The number of false positives always increases as the 
number of combined SATs increases. 
H3: The best combination of SATs is the same across de-
velopment scenarios. 
H4: The best combination of SATs is the same across dif-
ferent classes of vulnerabilities. 
Although the response to the hypotheses above may seem 
obvious, empirical evidences are missing in the literature to bet-
ter understand the advantages and limitations of different com-
binations of SATS, when considering representative vulnerabil-
ity detection scenarios. For example, a less informed researcher 
or developer could easily state that the number of vulnerabilities 
detected increases as the number of combined SATs increases, 
however, knowing in which scenarios that is true, to which 
amount that happens for different types of vulnerabilities, and 
what is the impact in terms of false positives, are aspects that 
require more detailed studies, as the one presented here. 
Our study is based on the results of benchmarking five free 
SATs to detect SQL injection (SQLi) and cross-site scripting 
(XSS) vulnerabilities in a workload of 134 WordPress plugins, 
organized in four vulnerability detection scenarios. We focus on 
free SATs as both occasional developers and professional soft-
ware houses wanting to speed up the development process and 
reduce cost tend to use free tools as much as possible. Further-
more, such tools are easily available for research and results can 
be published without infringing licensing agreements. As for the 
workload, it is important to note that, according to WhiteSecu-
rity statistics, from 42,000+ WordPress Websites in Alexa Top 
1 Million, more than 73% of the installations have vulnerabili-
ties, which could be potentially detected using free automated 
tools [21]. SQLi and XSS are information flow vulnerabilities 
that are on the top three of web security vulnerabilities [5], and 
are also quite common in WordPress plugins [27]. 
Results show that different combinations of tools achieve 
different performance, both in terms of vulnerabilities detected 
and false positives. Also, there are tradeoffs that should be con-
sidered when combining tools, which may influence decisions 
depending on the scenario where the tools will be used. There 
are even cases where using a single tool provides better results 
than combining multiple tools. These observations and others 
discussed later emphasize the need for a process to study the ef-
fectiveness of diverse tools, as the one proposed in this paper. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Next section presents 
the dataset used in the study. Section 3 discusses the metrics and 
Section 4 presents the process for combining the outputs of mul-
tiple SATs. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 
6 discusses related work and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
II. DATASET 
The dataset used is based on the results of benchmarking five 
free SATs looking for SQLi and XSS vulnerabilities in 134 
WordPress plugins. Four criticality levels representing realistic 
scenarios were considered (we adapted the names of the scenar-
ios defined by Antunes et al. [20] to better represent their re-
quirements, but maintained their scope): 
1. Highest-quality - every vulnerability missed may be a 
big problem due to the high criticality of the application; 
2. High-quality - a few non-trivial vulnerabilities may be 
missed given that there are not many FPs;  
3. Medium-quality - vulnerabilities may be missed at the 
cost of reducing the FPs;  
4. Lowest-quality - every FP is an important cause of con-
cern due to budget restrictions. 
SQLi and XSS vulnerabilities occur when input data are not 
properly validated. A SQLi attack is based on the injection of 
code that changes the SQL query sent to the database and an 
XSS attack consists in the injection of malicious JavaScript in 
the input of a vulnerable web page. Both SQLi and XSS attacks 
are very serious to enterprises and individuals, since they may 
allow security violations such as manipulating unauthorized da-
tabase data and causing denial of service. 
For detecting the SQLi and XSS vulnerabilities in the Word-
Press plugins we used the following SATs: RIPS v0.55 [8], Pixy 
v3.03 [7], phpSAFE [10], WAP v2.0.1 [11], and WeVerca 
v20150804 [24]. RIPS performs static taint analysis and string 
analysis. RIPS and Pixy are the two most referenced PHP SATs 
in the literature, but they are not ready for OOP analysis. Pixy 
has not been updated since 2007 and RIPS has only been devel-
oped as open source until 2014. RIPS has recently released a 
commercial version able to fully analyze OOP code [25]. WAP, 
phpSAFE, and WeVerca are recent tools under active develop-
ment, and they are prepared for OOP code.  
A. Selecting the plugins 
The online WPScan Vulnerability Database (WPVD) [27] 
provides a list of WordPress plugins with known vulnerabilities 
including, for most of them, proofs of concept (PoC) and other 
details, like the CVE identifier. From this list (on 2015/10/16) 
we selected all the plugins with SQLi and/or XSS vulnerabili-
ties. The result is a list of 134 plugins with 152 SQLi (84 with 
PoC) and 67 XSS (13 with PoC) vulnerabilities registered. In 
practice, the dataset consists of 103 object-oriented program-
ming (OOP) plugins and 31 procedural (POP) plugins having a 
total of 4,990 PHP files and 1,023,081 lines of code (LOC), 
where 57% is OOP, 32% is POP, and 11% are mix of both. The 
workload contains 466,164 LLOC (Logical LOC), where 39.5% 
are POP, 47.8% are OOP, and 12.7% is a mix of both. 
B. Assigning plugins to scenarios 
To compose the workload, we need to assign a representative 
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group of vulnerable plugins to each scenario. Since this is very 
hard to achieve (e.g., real business-critical software is often kept 
secret) and has an associated level of subjectivity (e.g., there are 
different interpretations of what constitutes critical software), 
we propose a general procedure to classify applications based on 
code quality. Generically, the assumption is that scenarios that 
are more stringent normally run software with better quality. 
Therefore, we should assign applications with better quality to 
scenarios with more criticality. In practice, this means that a 
given set of plugins can be used in a scenario if their source code 
has a sufficient level of quality and admissible artefacts. 
The process for assigning plugins to scenarios has two steps. 
The first is based on the approach proposed by Baggen et al. [22] 
for rating the maintainability of the source code of applications 
(from 0.5 to 5.5 stars). The Baggen’s approach uses a standard-
ized measurement model based on the ISO/IEC 9126 definition 
of maintainability and a small set of source code metrics (SCMs) 
(e.g., Cyclomatic Complexity Number (CCN2) [23]). These 
SCMs are used to measure the Software Product Properties 
(SPPs) (e.g., Unit Complexity) of the software. Table I outlines 
the SPPs and their relationship with the maintainability sub-
characteristics. The table also includes an example of assigning 
a rating to an application. The ratings of the sub-characteristics 
are obtained by averaging the ratings of the properties where a 
‘×’ is present in the sub-characteristic’s line in the table. The 
final rating is obtained by summing the average ratings and di-
viding by 4 (in the example: (4.0+4.0+2.6+3.5)/4 = 3.5 stars). 
The Baggen’s method is applied by the Software Improvement 
Group (SIG) to annually re-calibrate the SIG quality model [19], 
which forms the basis of the evaluation and certification of soft-
ware maintainability conducted by SIG [20] and TÜViT [18]. 
The second step of the process is based on a simple schema 
for mapping the ratings in scenarios. Since the ratings vary from 
0.5 to 5.5 in ascendant quality order and the scenarios from 1 to 
4 in descendent level of criticality, we used the following map-
ping rating-scenario: [4.5, 5.5[ - Scenario 1 (highest-quality); 
[3.5,4.5[ - Scenario 2 (high-quality); [2.5, 3.5[ - Scenario 3 (me-
dium quality); and [0.5, 2.5[ - Scenario 4 (lowest-quality). As 
shown, we used intervals of 1 for mapping the ratings into the 
scenarios, trying to respect Baggen’s approach, except for the 
less stringent (and probably less relevant) scenario, which ac-
commodates all the ratings below 2.5 (code of lower quality). 
The results of applying the proposed process are presented 
in Table II, which shows the plugins that compose the workload, 
distributed over the four scenarios. Scenario 1 has a lower num-
ber of plugins compared with 2 and 3. This is realistic as finding 
code with very high quality is not trivial. At the same time, the 
WordPress plugins considered have been download and used so 
many times that a given level of quality is expected (they would 
not be used that much if that was not the case). Thus, the number 
of high- and medium-quality plugins is also much higher than 
the number of low-quality plugins. In terms of LOCs, the aver-
age size of the plugins tends to increase as the quality decreases 
(it is more difficult to assure quality for larger pieces of code).  
C. Characterizing vulnerable LOCs 
To evaluate a SAT, we need to know which LOCs are vul-
nerable (i.e., positive instances (P)) and which LOCs are not vul-
nerable (i.e., negative instances (N)). For large code bases, this 
is a hard task that requires a thorough review by security experts, 
and the result might not be completely accurate (as experts can 
also make mistakes).  
A vulnerability may manifest in a restricted set of constructs 
(e.g., XSS in PHP’s echo) of the programming language, named 
sensitive sinks (SS). Although the number of vulnerable LOCs 
in an application is limited to the lines that include such con-
structs, the number of vulnerabilities can potentially be greater 
than the number of LOCs, because one LOC can have several 
vulnerabilities. For example, the PHP LOC echo "$name $cate-
gory", may have two XSS vulnerabilities (due to the two varia-
bles used). SATs report results in different manners, for exam-
ple, some SATs may report the sources of untrusted data (Entry 
Points (EP)), where others report the SS where that data is used 
in a risky way. Thus, in this work, we count the vulnerabilities 
at the level of the LOC. This means that a LOC with one or more 
vulnerabilities represents one positive instance. 
Our approach to find vulnerable LOCs (VLOCs) in the 
workload is based on running the five SATs and on a manual 
review to confirm the results. Thus, to obtain the vulnerable 
LOCs, we ran the five SATs to scan for SQLi and XSS vulner-
abilities in the workload. phpSAFE, RIPS, WAP and Pixy were 
configured by default for PHP entry points, sensitive sinks and 
sanitization functions (SF) (e.g., htmlentities, mysql_real_es-
cape_string). WeVerca does not allow configuration and in-
cludes a programmed list of EPs, SSs, and SFs. Overall, 
phpSAFE was unable to analyze 18 plugins. WAP analyzed all 
plugins, but seven of them only partially. RIPS and Pixy 
analyzed partially 76 and 103 plugins, respectively. WeVerca 
was not able to analyze a total of 20 source files of 14 plugins. 
In practice, the tools could not to fully analyze some plugin/files, 
reporting runtime errors or taking a very long time without any 
results. This is potentially due to the size/complexity of some 
files and/or limitations of the static analysis tools used. 
The outputs of the tools were combined and each candidate 
vulnerability was manually reviewed to determinate if it was a 
TP (i.e., vulnerable LOC or P) or a FP (i.e., non-vulnerable LOC 
or N). The union of all TPs became part of the set of positive 
instances (P) and the union of all FPs become part of the list of 
non-vulnerable LOCs. As tools may miss vulnerabilities (FNs) 
and, even when using multiple SATs, some vulnerabilities may 
TABLE I – MAPPING OF SOFTWARE PRODUCT PROPERTIES TO ISO/IEC 
SUB-CHARACTERISTICS OF MAINTAINABILITY. 
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Ratings example 5 4 3 4 3 3 2 3  
Analyzability × × ×          4.0 
Changeability × ×   × ×      4.0 
Stability          × × × 2.6 
Testability   × × ×      × 3.5 
Maintainability rating (average:   ) 3.5 
TABLE II – PLUGIN BACKGROUND INFORMATION.
Scenarios OOP POP Total %Tot. Files LLOC %LLOC
Highest-quality 10 2 12 9.0 352 19,542 4.2
High-quality  39 17 56 41.8 1,687 122,835 26.4
Medium-quality  40 11 51 38.1 2,223 211,297 45.3
Low-quality  14 1 15 11.2 728 112,490 24.1
Total 103 31 134 100.0 4,990 466,164 100.0
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remain undetected [26], the number of vulnerable LOCs that we 
found is likely less than the real number, which may introduce 
bias in the evaluation metrics. To minimize this issue, we also 
added to the list of non-vulnerable LOCs all the vulnerabilities 
registered in the public online WPScan Vulnerability Database 
[4] for the target plugins (see Table III).  
D. Characterizing non-vulnerable LOCs  
Data coming from untrusted user inputs can be propagated 
to one or more variables through data flows, control flows, func-
tion calls and return statements. From all LOCs in a program, 
only LOCs with SSs outputting at least one variable are suscep-
tible to be vulnerable. Thus, LOCs with SSs outputting fixed 
data (i.e., without any output variable) are not vulnerable. The 
remaining LOCs (non-SSs) certainly are not vulnerable. 
To obtain the list of NVLOCs, we developed a PHP script 
for gathering all SS function calls of the source code files based 
on their Abstract Syntax Tree (AST). From this list, we removed 
the items that were already labeled as VLOC (previous section). 
The script is very simple and is executed individually for each 
file. A manual check of random samples has been performed to 
increase trust on the accuracy of the NVLOCs identified.  
E. Summary of the vulnerable and non-vulnerable LOCs 
Table III reports the results of the processes for characteriz-
ing VLOCs and NVLOCs in the workload. The table depicts the 
number of TPs and FPs reported by the SATs, followed by the 
number of vulnerabilities registered in the online WPScan Vul-
nerability Database (column VD) [27]. The column NVLOC 
shows the NVLOCs obtained from the process for characteriz-
ing non-vulnerable LOCs. The two last columns show the total 
number of positive instances (the distinct VLOCs), and the total 
number of negative instances (the combination of the FPs with 
the list of NVLOC). These two last columns are the ones that 
will be used to calculate the metrics.  
III. METRICS 
Different tools may report different sets of vulnerabilities 
and false positives. When combining the results of several tools 
both the number of correctly detected vulnerabilities and the 
number of FPs are likely to increase. Although the detection of 
more vulnerabilities is the objective, particularly in critical sce-
narios, a high number of FPs may be undesirable in some cases. 
For evaluating the SATs we propose the use of metrics that 
are adequate to the vulnerability detection scenario. As men-
tioned before, our approach is based on the scenarios defined by 
Antunes et al. [20]. For each scenario, Antunes et al. also pro-
posed one main metric to rank the tools and a tiebreaker metric 
used only when there is among between tools (see Table IV).  
In practice, the metrics depend on the goals of the detection, 
which are related with the amount of available resources to fix 
the vulnerabilities (see Table V). Therefore, there is one main 
metric to rank the tools in each scenario. For example, for the 
highest-quality scenario the goal is to find the highest number 
vulnerabilities at any cost. Therefore, the metric recall is used to 
measure this global information. However, it ignores the preci-
sion (FPs) of the results. Only in the case of a tie, the precision 
metric is used to rank first the tool that reports less FPs. 
The metrics recall=TP/ (TP+FN), precision=TP/(TP+FP) 
and F-Measure=2×TP/ (2×TP+FP +FN) are well known and 
widely used. Next, we define the remaining ones (see also [28]): 
Informedness = Recall + Inverse Recall – 1 = 
TP/(TP+FN)+TN/(FP+TN)–1. Requires knowing both the 
overall number of positive and negative instances. Therefore, 
every TP increases the metric in the proportion 1/P and every FP 
decreases the metric in the proportion 1/N.  
Markedness = Precision + Inverse Precision – 1 =   
TP/(TP+FP)+TN/(FN+TN)–1. Considers only the number of 
TPs and PFs reported. The metric sums the proportions of the 
positives and the negatives that are correctly identified as such. 
IV. COMBINING THE RESULTS OF MULTIPLE SATS 
 For testing our hypotheses, all combinations of tools should 
be considered for each scenario and class of vulnerabilities. The 
process proposed to calculate the combined results for two or 
more tools is based on a set of automated steps (see Fig. 1):  
1) Calculate the number of P and N in the workload - 
using the lists of VLOCs and NVLOCs, and the distribution of 
the plugins per scenario, calculate the number of P and the 
number of N for each scenario and for each class of 
vulnerability, as described in Section II (and summarized in Ta-
ble III). 
2) Combine results of SATs - for each scenario, class of 
vulnerability and possible combination of the SATs, merge the 
outputs of the tools discarding duplicated TPs and FPs. 
TABLE III – DISTRIBUTION OF VULNERABILITIES AND 
NON-VULNERABILITIES BY SCENARIOS AND VD 
Scenario Tools VD NVLOC Total  
TP FP P P N 
SQ
L
i 
1 65 5 17 82 75 87 
2 318 62 35 1053 346 1115
3 251 163 22 2051 267 2214
4 41 32 10 1105 50 1137
Total 675 262 84 4291 738 4553
X
SS
 
1 165 45 3 945 168 990 
2 1841 224 1 5601 1842 5825 
3 2386 680 4 9289 2389 9969 
4 543 117 5 3477 545 3594 
Total 4935 1066 13 19312 4944 20378 
Total 5610 1328 97 23603 5682 24931 
TABLE IV – SUMMARY OF METRICS BY SCENARIO
Scenario Antunes et al. Scenario  Metric Tiebreaker 
1 - Highest-quality Business-critical Recall Precision 
2 - High-quality  Heightened-critical Informedness Recall 
3 - Medium-quality Best-effort F-Measure Recall 
4 - Low-quality  Min-effort Markedness Precision 
TABLE V – GOALS OF VULNERABILITY DETECTION BY SCENARIO
Scenario TP FP Resources to fix 
1 - Highest-quality   highest many all that are needed 
2 - High-quality  highest not many balanced appropriately 
3 - Medium-quality  high low limit, redirected to fix 
4 - Low-quality  high lowest very low 
Fig. 1 – Overall process of combining the results of multiple tools.
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3) Calculate the combined confusion matrices - with the 
outputs from 1) and 2) calculate, for each scenario, class of 
vulnerability and combination of tools, the corresponding 
confusion matrix (i.e., TP, FP, FN, and TN). 
4) Calculate the metrics and rank - with the results from 
3), compute the metrics recommended for each scenario (see 
Table V) and rank the combinations of tools. 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results for each combination of the five SATs, organized 
by scenario and type of vulnerability, are presented in Table VI 
(SQLi on the left-side and XSS on the right-side). Columns TP, 
FP, FN, and TN show the confusion matrix for the correspond-
ing combination. The table shows only the TOP 7 (of 32) com-
binations of SATs for each scenario and type of vulnerability, 
due space limitations (detailed results can be found at [29]). The 
table also includes the ranking of the individual tools, as refer-
ence. The data are firstly ordered by the main metric (column 
Metric), secondly by the tiebreak metric (column Tiebreaker), 
and finally by the number of SATs in the combination.  
To simplify the presentation of the results we assigned a 
character to each tool: a - phpSAFE, b - RIPS, c - WAP, d-Pixy, 
and e - WeVerca. Note that vulnerability detection using static 
analysis is a deterministic process, thus running the same tool 
several times always leads to the same results. 
A. Results for SQLi vulnerabilities 
The goal in the highest-quality scenario is to find the high-
est number of vulnerabilities, even if reporting many FPs. There-
fore, the best solution is ac, as it has the least number of SATs 
(Table VI (a)). We see that RIPS, Pixy and WeVerca did not find 
vulnerabilities and did not report FPs. In this scenario, there are 
2 POP plugins and 10 OOP (see Table II) plugins with 43% of 
POP code. Thus, the results of RIPS and Pixy are probably be-
cause they are not prepared to analyze OOP code.  
In the high-quality scenario, the combination that ranks 
first is acde, with the highest number of vulnerabilities found 
(318). In 2nd place there is a similar solution (abce) with the same 
number of vulnerabilities, but one more FP. Individually, we see 
that phpSAFE found many vulnerabilities but also many FPs, 
while the others report less vulnerabilities and zero or few FPs.  
In the medium-quality scenario, the combination of SATs 
that ranks first is abce with both the highest number of vulnera-
bilities found (251) and FPs (163). The solutions in the positions 
2-8, have the same number of FPs and successively less vulner-
abilities. In the 9th place there is a solution composed by three 
SATs (acd) with about 2/3 of the vulnerabilities found and 2/5 
of FPs. In terms of vulnerabilities detected, this solution per-
forms similarly to RIPS (b) individually. However, RIPS reports 
about the double of FPs. This means that, the best individual 
SAT (a) can be replaced by a combination of SATs (acd) that 
individually perform worse than it, but together perform better. 
The best solution for the low-quality scenario is bc, with 6 
TPs and zero FPs. Since the resources available for fixing vul-
nerabilities in this scenario are very limited, this solution fits 
very well in its goal. Note that, phpSAFE individually (SAT a) 
reports six times more vulnerabilities (36), but also many more 
FPs (32), which is not desirable in this case. 
B. Results for XSS vulnerabilities 
For the highest-quality scenario, and focusing on XSS vul-
nerabilities (see Table VI (b)), the best solution is the combina-
tion ab, which detected the highest number of vulnerabilities 
(165). In the 2nd position, there is a combination of three SATs 
(abe) that detected the same number of vulnerabilities and re-
ported the same number of FPs (34). A key observation is that 
the combination ab detected the same vulnerabilities as WeV-
erca (e) individually, as well as other vulnerabilities.  The solu-
tions from the 3rd place to the 7th place also detected the same 
number of vulnerabilities of the two first solutions, but reported 
two more FPs. The number of SATs in these solutions varies 
from two to five. As shown, adding a tool to an existing solution 
does not always increase the number of vulnerabilities found.  
In the high-quality scenario, the best combination of SATs 
is abce, which has the highest number of vulnerabilities detected 
(1841), but also has the highest number of FPs (224). In this 
case, every FP decreases the informedness metric by 0.02% 
(1/5825) while every TP (1/1842) increases the metric by 0.05%. 
Therefore, all the FPs reported decrease the metric only 3,56% 
(227/5825). For that reason, the best solution is the one with both 
the highest number of TPs and FPs. 
The best combination of SATs to detect XSS vulnerabilities 
in the medium-quality scenario is also abde. We see that this 
combination of SATs is better than others because it has the 
highest number of TPs, but also the highest number of FPs. This 
is because the recommend metric, F-Measure, does not consider 
the TNs and it considers the TPs more important than the FPs.  
SAT c (WAP) comes alone in the 1st position for the low-
quality scenario. It detected 62 TPs and reported only 3 FPs. It 
means both high precision and inverse precision. Therefore, the 
resources will be consumed for fixing vulnerabilities, as desired 
for this scenario, instead of being wasted confirming FPs. How-
ever, from the 2nd to 8th positions there are combinations of SATs 
that detected about ten times more TPs but more than thirty 
times more FPs than SAT c. For example, the solution in the 2nd 
position, abce, detected 543 TPs but also reported over 39 times 
more of FPs (117) which is not acceptable for this scenario. Like 
for SQLi vulnerabilities in this same scenario, the SAT a 
(phpSAFE) reported both many vulnerabilities and many FPs. 
Finally, unlike for SQLi vulnerabilities, tool b (RIPS) reported 
both the highest number of TPs and FPs. This shows that tools 
may have different performance depending on the type of vul-
nerability being detected. 
It is important to emphasize that, considering the top seven 
combinations presented for each scenario, SAT a (phpSAFE) is 
included in all cases excepted for the low-quality scenario, SAT 
b is included in five solutions, SAT c in seven, SAT d in one, 
and SAT e in four. SAT c is the tool that reported less FPs in 
almost all scenarios, despite it is not the SAT that found more 
vulnerabilities. Thus, the effectiveness of existing solutions has 
a high probability to improve when SAT c is added to these so-
lutions. SATs a and b reports both many vulnerabilities and FPs. 
The individual ranking of the SAT d is always below the middle 
of the ranking and is the worst of all in 4 of 8 cases. This is prob-
ably because SAT d is old and not prepared for analyzing OOP 
code. However, despite being recent and prepared for OOP 
code, SAT e has a performance similar to d. 
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C. Testing the four hypotheses 
Based on our findings, all hypotheses stated in the introduc-
tion are false. Hypothesis H1 (the number of vulnerabilities de-
tected always increases as the number of combined SATs in-
creases) is false because we found many cases where adding a 
SAT to an existing combination of SATs, does not increase the 
number of vulnerabilities found (e.g., for the highest-quality sce-
nario and XSS: ab, abe, abce). On the other hand, we also ob-
served that the number of FPs does not always increase with the 
number of SATs in a combination (e.g., for the medium-quality 
scenario and SQLi: ab, abe, abde). Therefore, hypothesis H2 (the 
number of false positives always increases as the number of 
combined SATs increases) is also false. As there is frequently an 
overlap between the FPs reported by different SATs, in some 
cases combinations with more tools can detect more vulnerabil-
ities, while maintaining the same number of FPs. Also note that, 
none of the best combinations includes all SATs. 
The best solution for vulnerability detection depends on the 
chosen scenario and on class of vulnerability. Therefore, hy-
potheses H3 (the best combination of SATs is the same across 
development scenarios) and H4 (the best combination of SATs is 
the same across different classes of vulnerabilities) are both 
false. In fact, the detection capabilities of the SATs are not uni-
form across the two classes of vulnerabilities. The same occurs 
for combinations of SATs. Moreover, in almost all cases the val-
ues of the metrics for XSS vulnerabilities are better than for the 
SQLi vulnerabilities. 
In summary, the main advantage of combining the results of 
several SATs is the identification of more vulnerabilities. In fact, 
for several cases there are SATs that individually did not find 
any vulnerabilities or found few vulnerabilities in many plugins. 
Moreover, we observed that even using all the SATs some vul-
nerabilities remain undetected. A key remark is that combining 
many tools can be counterproductive in some cases as that will 
not lead to the detection of more vulnerabilities, but will increase 
the number of FPs reported, which then need to be verified man-
ually by the developers. Finally, identifying the strengths and 
limitations of SATs, helps developers to determinate how such 
tools can be combined to provide a more thorough analysis of 
the software depending on the specificities of the scenario and 
on the class of vulnerability being analyzed. 
D. Threats to validity 
1) Workload - The workload across the various scenarios is 
unbalanced, which may affect the results in some cases. For ex-
ample, in the low-quality scenario and for SQLi, only one SAT 
reported vulnerabilities, which may limit our study. Works us-
ing other tools are needed for improving the characterization of 
the vulnerable/non-vulnerable LOCs in the workload. 
2) Vulnerabilities - There are limitations regarding the 
scope of the workload in this experiment, since it considers only 
WordPress plugins, SQLi, and XSS vulnerabilities. Future 
studies should expand the workload to include other kinds of 
applications and classes of vulnerabilities. 
3) Free SATs - All SATs used in this study are free. Pixy 
is not updated since 2007 and RIPS has only been developed as 
open source until 2014. On the other hand, WAP, phpSAFE, 
and WeVerca are recent tools prepared do analyze OOP code. 
There are several commercial and other free SATs, thus, the 
results of this study are only valid for the tools used.  
4) Tools configuration - The dataset used in this study was 
collected with all tools configured by default for PHP entry 
points, sensitive sinks and sanitization functions. The results of 
the tools may be improved (+TP and -FP) by adjusting their 
configuration settings for WordPress built-in database 
functions, sanitization and escaping routines. 
We are obviously aware of the limitations of our study, but 
would like to emphasize that the main observations of the paper 
hold in many situations. Regardless of the threats, results show 
that the number of vulnerabilities detected does not always in-
crease as the number of combined SATs increases (~H1), the 
number of false positives does not always increase as the num-
ber of combined SATs increases (~H2), the best combination of 
SATs does vary across development scenarios (~H3), and there 
are differences on the best combination of SATs across classes 
of vulnerabilities (~H4). 
VI. RELATED WORK 
Rutar et al. [17] studied five well-known SATs on a small 
set of Java programs with different sizes from various domains. 
They concluded that the results of each tool are highly correlated 
with the techniques used for finding bugs, and that no single tool 
can be considered the best to detect defects. They proposed a 
meta-tool for automatically combining and correlating their out-
puts. This meta-tool is based on a set of scripts that combine the 
results of the various tools in a common format. The bugs found 
are not manually reviewed, thus, there is no distinction between 
TP and FP. The metric used to evaluate and compare the tools 
was the number of bugs found by each tool.  
Meng et al. [19] proposed an approach to merge the results 
of multiple SATs. The user specifies the programs to be ana-
lyzed and chooses the classes of bugs to be scanned. The ap-
proach then determines which tools can search for the specified 
class of bugs, generates the necessary configurations to run the 
tools, runs the tools, combines the outputs in a single report, and 
applies two prioritizing policies to rank the results. Meng et al. 
used their approach to conclude that developers could benefit 
from more than one SAT.  Like the Rutar’s approach, the results 
were not classified as TP and FP and the authors did not propose 
any metric to evaluate the approach. The workload was com-
posed by a small Java program that is not representative of real 
applications. Therefore, with such limited validation it is very 
difficult to assess the strength and drawbacks of the solution.  
Wang et al. [18] proposed an approach that combines multi-
ple SATs in a simple Web Service. The user has the possibility 
to choose the classes of bugs to scan and upload the source code 
and auxiliary information such as the programming language 
and the classes of bugs to be scanned. The tools perform the 
analysis of the source code and results are merged in a way that 
the same defect is only reported once. The combined results are 
sent back to the user. The approach was evaluated in terms of 
running time when combining two SATs, but the experiments 
were quite limited, having just a single Java test case. Therefore, 
the solution lacks the validation of the effectiveness of the vul-
nerability detection when using a combination of SATs. 
The National Security Agency (NSA) Center for Assured 
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Software (CAS) specified a methodology, the CAS Static Anal-
ysis Tool Study Methodology, that measures and rates the effec-
tiveness of SATs in a standard and repeatable manner [26]. The 
main goal is to provide objective information to organizations 
that want to purchase commercial SATs or to use free ones. The 
metrics used are precision, recall, F-Score (i.e., F-Measure), 
and discrimination rate (DR). DR = #Discriminations/#Bugs, is 
the fraction of test cases where SATs report a discrimination. A 
discrimination occurs if a SAT reports a vulnerability in the vul-
nerable test case and keeps quiet in the non-vulnerable test case. 
Thus, for each pair of test cases, a discrimination occurs if a SAT 
reports a vulnerability (TP) present in the vulnerable test case 
and keep quiet in the non-vulnerable test case (i.e., the tool does 
not report FPs). 
The CAS has created a collection over 81,000 synthetic 
C/C++ and Java programs with known flaws called as the Juliet 
Test Suite, which is available online [30]. Each test case is a slice 
of artificial code having exactly one flaw and at least one non-
flaw construct similar to the vulnerability. In 2011, the CAS con-
ducted a study with the purpose of determining the capabilities 
TABLE VI – RANKING OF COMBINED TOOLS (TOP 8) AND RANKING OF INDIVIDUAL TOOLS 
(a) SQLi 
Tools TP FP FN TN #Plug Metric Tiebreaker
 Highest-quality  Recall Precision
ac 65 5 10 82 9 0.867 0.929
ace 65 5 10 82 9 0.867 0.929
abce 65 5 10 82 9 0.867 0.929
acde 65 5 10 82 9 0.867 0.929
abc 65 5 10 82 9 0.867 0.929
acd 65 5 10 82 9 0.867 0.929
abcd 65 5 10 82 9 0.867 0.929
Individual rank 
c 49 4 26 83 7 0.653 0.925
a 29 5 46 82 5 0.387 0.853
e 0 0 75 87 0 0.000 -
b 0 0 75 87 0 0.000 -
d 0 0 75 87 0 0.000 -
 High-quality  Informedness Recall
acde 318 59 28 1056 36 0.866 0.919
abce 318 60 28 1055 36 0.865 0.919
abcde 318 60 28 1055 36 0.865 0.919
ace 316 59 30 1056 36 0.860 0.913
acd 311 58 35 1057 35 0.847 0.899
abc 311 60 35 1055 35 0.845 0.899
abcd 311 60 35 1055 35 0.845 0.899
Individual rank 
a 274 58 72 1057 30 0.740 0.792
c 44 4 302 1111 12 0.124 0.127
b 43 2 303 1113 8 0.123 0.124
e 18 1 328 1114 6 0.051 0.052
d 16 0 330 1115 7 0.046 0.046
 Medium-quality  F-Measure Recall
abce 251 163 16 2051 21 0.737 0.940
abcde 251 163 16 2051 21 0.737 0.940
abc 250 163 17 2051 21 0.735 0.936
abcd 250 163 17 2051 21 0.735 0.936
abde 237 163 30 2051 19 0.711 0.888
abd 236 163 31 2051 19 0.709 0.884
abe 235 163 32 2051 19 0.707 0.880
Individual rank 
b 153 113 114 2101 6 0.574 0.573
a 99 50 168 2164 15 0.476 0.371
c 72 0 195 2214 11 0.425 0.270
d 54 13 213 2201 4 0.323 0.202
e 21 34 246 2180 3 0.130 0.079
 Low-quality  Markedness Precision
bc 6 0 44 1137 2 0.963 1.000
bce 6 0 44 1137 2 0.963 1.000
bcde 6 0 44 1137 2 0.963 1.000
bcd 6 0 44 1137 2 0.963 1.000
c 5 0 45 1137 2 0.962 1.000
ce 5 0 45 1137 2 0.962 1.000
cde 5 0 45 1137 2 0.962 1.000
Individual rank 
c 5 0 45 1137 2 0.962 1.000
b 1 0 49 1137 1 0.959 1.000
a 36 32 14 1105 7 0.517 0.529
e 0 0 50 1137 0 - -
d 0 0 50 1137 0 - -
a - phpSAFE, b - RIPS, c - WAP, d – Pixy, e - WeVerca
 
(b) XSS 
Tools TP FP FN TN #Plug Metric Tiebreaker
Highest-quality Recall Precision
ab 165 43 3 947 11 0.982 0.793
abe 165 43 3 947 11 0.982 0.793
abc 165 45 3 945 11 0.982 0.786
abd 165 45 3 945 11 0.982 0.786
abce 165 45 3 945 11 0.982 0.786
abde 165 45 3 945 11 0.982 0.786
abcde 165 45 3 945 11 0.982 0.786
Individual rank 
b 113 29 55 961 10 0.673 0.796
a 102 18 66 972 8 0.607 0.850
d 69 14 99 976 7 0.411 0.831
e 44 5 124 985 7 0.262 0.898
c 23 6 145 984 3 0.137 0.793
High-quality Informedness Recall
abce 1841 224 1 5601 51 0.961 1.000
abcde 1841 224 1 5601 51 0.961 1.000
abe 1838 223 4 5602 51 0.960 0.998
abde 1838 223 4 5602 51 0.960 0.998
abc 1770 224 72 5601 51 0.923 0.961
abcd 1770 224 72 5601 51 0.923 0.961
abd 1767 223 75 5602 51 0.921 0.959
Individual rank 
a 1164 90 678 5735 46 0.617 0.632
b 1013 194 829 5631 46 0.517 0.550
e 436 50 1406 5775 25 0.228 0.237
d 453 148 1389 5677 28 0.221 0.246
c 219 55 1623 5770 18 0.110 0.119
Medium-quality F-Measure Recall
abce 2386 652 3 9317 46 0.879 0.999
abcde 2386 652 3 9317 46 0.879 0.999
abc 2383 652 6 9317 46 0.879 0.998
abcd 2383 652 6 9317 46 0.879 0.998
abde 2359 652 30 9317 46 0.874 0.987
abe 2345 652 44 9317 46 0.871 0.982
abd 2328 652 61 9317 46 0.867 0.975
Individual rank 
b 1812 490 577 9479 43 0.773 0.759
a 970 267 1419 9702 41 0.535 0.406
d 717 56 1672 9913 23 0.454 0.300
e 621 21 1768 9948 19 0.410 0.260
c 344 13 2045 9956 18 0.251 0.144
Low-quality Markedness Precision
c 62 3 483 3591 6 0.835 0.954
abce 543 117 2 3477 12 0.822 0.823
abcde 543 117 2 3477 12 0.822 0.823
abc 542 117 3 3477 12 0.822 0.823
abcd 542 117 3 3477 12 0.822 0.823
abde 534 116 11 3478 12 0.818 0.822
abe 533 116 12 3478 12 0.818 0.821
Individual rank 
c 62 3 483 3591 6 0.835 0.954
a 244 33 301 3561 10 0.803 0.881
e 73 8 472 3586 7 0.785 0.901
b 377 91 168 3503 10 0.760 0.806
d 51 7 494 3587 9 0.758 0.879
#Plug - number of plugins where the SATs found vulnerabilities 
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of five SATs for C/C++ and Java [31]. In this study, they pro-
posed the combination of two SATs to show that adding a sec-
ond SAT might complement the first one. However, the evalua-
tion of the combinations is limited because it is based on the 
metrics recall and DR. The metric recall does not consider the 
number of FPs reported, and the DR severely penalizes SATs 
that report many vulnerabilities but also reports FPs. Further-
more, they also evaluated the overall coverage (recall) of four 
combinations of SATs. The SATs were labeled with a number 
from 1 to 5. Then, the combination of SATs: 12, 123, 1234, and 
12345, were evaluated across all the test cases. They concluded 
that the recall increases as the number of tools increases. How-
ever, like in the evaluation of combinations of two SATs this is 
limited as there are many combinations that were not considered.    
Unlike the approaches above, that use a small workload or 
synthetic simple test cases, our approach is based on a consid-
erable number of real plugins and four representative vul-
nerability detection scenarios. Moreover, the workload is 
characterized in terms of vulnerable and non-vulnerable LOCs 
for a more precise classification of the results produced by the 
tools with respect to TP and FP. Another difference is that our 
study uses a single main metric to evaluate the combinations of 
SATs in each scenario that take into consideration the goals of 
the vulnerability detection in that scenario. In fact, the ap-
proaches previously referred use a simple metric such as the 
number of bugs that each tool founds or several metrics. In this 
case, the user has the task of choosing the metric that seem most 
appropriate and use it for evaluating a single SAT or combina-
tions of SATs, without any further guidance. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this work, we addressed the problem of combining the 
output of several SATs searching for SQLi and XSS vulnerabil-
ities in WordPress plugins. The workload is organized in four 
scenarios of increasing criticality. Each scenario uses different 
metrics to rank the tools. Our methodology is generic and can be 
used with other workloads and tools, either free or commercial.  
The results show that combining the outputs of several free 
SATs does not always improve the vulnerability detection per-
formance. Thus, the best solution can be a single tool or a com-
bination of tools that may not include all the tools under evalua-
tion. In principle, combining multiple static analysis tools has 
benefits due to the complementarity of the produced results. 
However, for solutions including SATs that report many FPs the 
overall performance is worse in some scenarios. In general, as 
the number of tools in a combination increases, both the new 
vulnerabilities found and the new FPs reported increase less and 
less and at different rates.  
Future work will focus on two main directions. First, we plan 
to validate our findings on larger and balanced workloads using 
more SATs. Second, as static analysis tools have different 
strengths and weaknesses, we plan to research novel ways to au-
tomatically find superior combinations. 
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